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A B S T R A C T
Advance selling is a marketing strategy commonly used by online retailers to increase sales
by exploiting consumer valuation uncertainty. Recently, some online retailers have started
to allow refunds on products sold in advance. On the one hand this reduces the net advance
sales, but on the other hand it allows a higher advance sales price. This research is the ﬁrst
to explore the overall effect of allowing a refund on proﬁts from advance sales, identifying
conditions where advance selling with or without refunds (or no advance selling at all) is
best. We analytically compare the proﬁts of three advance selling strategies: none, without
refund, and with refund.We show that selling in advance and allowing a refund is optimal for
products with a relatively small proﬁt margin and small strategic market size, and that the
added proﬁt can be considerable. Our results guide managers in selecting the right advance
selling strategy. To facilitate this, we graphically display, based on the two dimensions of
regular proﬁtmargin and strategicmarket size, under what conditions the different strategies
are optimal.
© 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Driven by the “customer is king” attitude, consumer return and refund policies are ubiquitous in regular sales today. Annu-
ally, U.S. customers return $264 billion worth of products (Kerr, 2013). Consumer return rates range from 5% to 9% for most
brick-and-mortar retailers and can be up to 35% for fashion apparel (Ferguson, Guide, & Souza, 2006). For mail order/online
retailers, return rates are usually larger than 18% and can be as high as 74% (Mostard, de Koster, & Teunter, 2005). Most returned
products have no functional or cosmetic defects and can be resold again (Lawton, 2008). These so-called false failure returns
result mainly from inventory overstock and from consumers dissatisfaction if a product does not live up to expectations.
Although a liberal return policy may increase sales, handling returns comes at a signiﬁcant expense to retailers. Return losses
can be up to 30% of product value for short life-cycle, time insensitive products (Guide, Souza, van Wassenhove, & Blackburn,
2006), and are around 25% for computermanufacturers (Ferguson et al., 2006). Tomaintain a proﬁtable business, online retailers
often attempt to reduce return costs either by cutting down the unit return handling costs and/or by reducing the quantity
of consumer returns. The latter is obviously preferred as it avoids all handling costs and increases sales revenue. One way to
achieve fewer returns is to charge customers for returns, either directly through a return (shipment) cost or indirectly by e.g.,
a restocking fee in B2B situations (Shulman, Coughlan, & Savaskan, 2009). Another way is to make consumers better informed,
reducing valuation uncertainty and thereby the risk of dissatisfaction. The latter way is especially crucial for online retailers.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses:wumeng@scu.edu.cn (M. Wu), r.h.teunter@rug.nl (R.H. Teunter), x.zhu@rug.nl (S.X. Zhu).
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However, consumer valuation uncertainty is not always bad. Indeed, many companies exploit it by offering consumers an
advance selling opportunity before a new product is available. In recent years, as a widely used marketing strategy by online
businesses, advance selling has been shown to be proﬁtable for many industries by increasing sales, and has become common
for a wide variety of products (e.g., consumer electronics, fashion products, software, videos, games, and books). Moreover,
advance selling could beneﬁt the retailer by reducing demand uncertainty (e.g., Tang, Rajaram, Alptekinoglu, & Ou, 2004; Li &
Zhang, 2013), and by updating/improving the demand forecast (e.g., Prasad, Stecke, & Zhao, 2011; Wu, Zhu, & Teunter, 2017).
Although quite a few authors have considered the proﬁtability of advanced selling, to the best of our knowledge, none have
considered offering a refund for advanced sales. This research is the ﬁrst to explore the overall effect of allowing a refund on
proﬁts from advance sales, identifying conditions where advance selling with or without refunds (or no advance selling at all)
is best. Most ﬁrms that sell in advance offer a substantial discount, e.g., Amazon offered a 20% pre-order discount on all newly
released video games in December 2016. Large discounts are needed to entice customers to buy in advance, despite their often
considerable valuation uncertainties. Improving product information can help in this respect, but obviously not eliminate all
valuation uncertainties completely. Allowing returns is an alternative or additional way to reduce the consumer’s risk, thereby
enabling ﬁrms to increase the advance selling price. Some online retailers have indeed started to allow returns for advanced
sales. For example, as one of the two largest B2C online retailers in China, JD accepts returns without any reasons within 7days
for all advanced sales since September 2015. Moreover, as the largest digital distribution platform for PC gaming, Steam offers
a full refund policy for all pre-ordered games if the refund request is submitted within two weeks of the game’s release and the
game has been played for less than 2hours. We remark that although consumers have a statutory right to return unsatisﬁed
products and get a full refund for regular sales in many countries, few countries offer this protection for advance sales. So,
whether or not to offer a refund option for advance sales is optional in most countries.
Our research reveals many new structural results and insights. We show that the (spot selling) proﬁt margin and the size of
the strategic market (i.e., consumers who consider buying in advance) are decisive factors in advance selling strategy selection.
Indeed, based on these two dimensions, we graphically show which policy (no advance selling, without refund, with refund)
is optimal. In particular, if the strategic market size and proﬁt margin are both relatively small, advance selling with a refund
is best and can be considerably more proﬁtable than other strategies. Moreover, our results show that the optimal advance
selling strategy is signiﬁcantly affected by consumer valuation uncertainty and return-related costs. To select the right advance
selling strategy, our results suggest that online retailers should precisely estimate the strategic market size, accurately predict
the uncertainty in consumer valuation, and control/reduce the return-related costs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we review the related literature. In Section 3,
we introduce the model settings. In Section 4, we propose a model for the newsvendor problem without advance selling as
a benchmark. In Section 5, we study the newsvendor’s advance selling decisions without refund. In Section 6, we study the
newsvendor’s advance selling decisions with refund. In Section 7, we provide numerical studies to examine how valuation
uncertainty and return-related costs affect the retailer’s optimal strategy and proﬁt. In Section 8, we conclude the paper.
2. Literature review
In line with the existing literature and our modeling in the next section, we mainly review contributions on advance selling
in the newsvendor framework. The literature is surveyed from two aspects: advance selling and product returns in Sections 2.1
and 2.2, respectively. In Section 2.3, we summarize and discuss our core contributions.
2.1. The newsvendor problem with advance selling
Existing papers that study advance selling typically consider consumers who have an uncertain value about the product
before it is on the market. Despite this uncertainty, these customers may be enticed to buy in advance when offered a discount,
thereby exploiting valuation uncertainty. Assuming independent consumer valuations, Shugan and Xie (2005) and Xie and
Shugan (2001) show that advance selling can indeed improve a retailer’s proﬁts. Further, by assuming that both the market size
and the amount of returned products are deterministic and modeling consumer returns in an “all or nothing” setting, Xie and
Shugan (2001) study the optimal refunding strategy and show that offering a partial refund can increase the proﬁt from advance
selling. Fay and Xie (2010) compare an advance selling strategy with a probabilistic selling strategy and show that uncertainty
and heterogeneity of consumer valuation can beneﬁt the retailer under both strategies in different ways. In cases with limited
supply, products can sometimes even be sold at a price premium in advance (e.g., Xie & Shugan, 2001). Yu, Kapuscinski, and Ahn
(2015) study the impact of interdependent valuations on a retailer’s advance selling strategy, and show that the retailer should
use a discount (premium) advance selling strategy if valuations are highly diverse (related). Besides the strategic considerations
of valuation uncertainty vs. discount, some researchers have recently considered other types of consumer behavior. Nasiry
and Popescu (2012) consider advance selling to strategic and regret-averse consumers, who anticipate regret when deciding
whether to advance purchase. Lim and Tang (2013) consider selling in advance to speculators who resell the purchased products
rather than consume them. Lee, Choi, and Cheng (2015) andWu et al. (2017) study the advance selling problemwhen consumers
are both strategic and loss averse.
Besides exploiting consumer valuation uncertainty, some researchers consider the beneﬁt of utilizing the realized advance
demand information as a driver for advance selling. When facing regular (myopic) consumers, Tang et al. (2004) and McCardle,
Rajaram, and Tang (2004) study the beneﬁts of an advance booking discount program and show that advance selling can
M. Wu, R. Teunter and S. Zhu / International Journal of Research in Marketing 36 (2019) 471–491 473
reduce inventory risk for a retailer. However, when facing strategic consumers, Li and Zhang (2013) study the impact of
advance demand information and show that more accurate advance demand information does not necessarily beneﬁt the seller.
Further, Wu et al. (2017) consider beneﬁts from both valuation uncertainty and improved demand forecasting by advertising.
They show that more accurate spot demand information from advance selling and advertising is beneﬁcial only if the advance
selling discount is relatively small and strategic market size is relatively large. Zhao and Stecke (2010) and Prasad et al. (2011)
consider the beneﬁts from both demand updating and valuation uncertainty to decide when a retailer should sell in advance
to risk averse and loss averse consumers. Cho and Tang (2013) and Zhao, Pang, and Stecke (2016) study how the advance
selling option affects the interactions between a retailer and a manufacturer in a decentralized supply chain. They show that
advance selling can hurt both retailer proﬁt and supply chain performance. Cachon and Feldman (2017) show that advance
selling is less beneﬁcial and may be harmful under competition.
In summary, consumer’s strategic behavior has been shown to have a signiﬁcant impact on a retailer’s optimal sales strategy.
However, to the best of our knowledge, no one has considered the option of allowing product returns with a full refund for items
sold in advance. Offering such an option may increase proﬁt from advance selling (further), as consumers may be persuaded
to buy at a lower discount. Moreover, there are real-life situations where ﬁrms are legally bound to offer a (free) return policy
under certain conditions (e.g., within 30days and undamaged/unused). We next discuss the literature on product returns.
2.2. Product returns
False failure product returns include both consumers unsatisfactory returns and overstocking returns caused by inaccurate
stocking decisions. The impact of product returns has received much attention from both the operation and the marketing
communities. In the operations literature, there is a body of work on stochastic inventory models with consumers returns. For
example, for a single period inventory problem, Mostard et al. (2005) and Mostard and Teunter (2006) study the newsvendor
problemwith resaleable returns and derive the optimal order quantity by using a net demand approach. Others have developed
both push and pull type strategies for controlling the stock of both returned products and (re)manufactured product simultane-
ously. We refer interested readers to Dekker, Fleischmann, Inderfurth, and vanWassenhove (2004), Pokharel and Mutha (2009)
and Govindan, Soleimani, and Kannan (2015) for detailed review of reverse logistics and remanufacturing.
Researchers have also analyzed supply chain performance and relationships between retailers and manufacturers under
different returns policies and channel structures. Ferguson et al. (2006) propose a target rebate contract to coordinate supply
chainwith returns and show that false failure returns can be reduced via supply chain coordinationmethods. Su (2009) discusses
the supply chain performance under both a full refund policy and a partial refund policy, and demonstrates that consumer
refund policies may distort incentives under coordination contracts. Xiao, Shi, and Yang (2010) integrate the consumer refund
policy andmanufacturer buy-back policy and design a buyback/markdownmoney contract to coordinate the supply chain under
a partial refund policy. Chen and Bell (2011) propose a new buy-back contract and set two buy-back prices for overstocking
returns and consumer unsatisfactory returns, respectively. They show that this type of contract can achieve perfect supply chain
coordination. Shulman, Coughlan, and Savaskan (2010) consider two reverse channel structures (salvaged by the retailer or
salvaged by the manufacturer) for returned products. They study the impact of the reverse channel structure on the equilibrium
return policy and proﬁt, and show that the manufacturer may earn more proﬁt by accepting returns even if the retailer has a
more eﬃcient way for salvaging returned products.
The marketing literature has mostly focused on how retailers can manage product-return policies to maximize future (long
term) proﬁts. For a complete review on product returns from the marketing literature, we refer to Minnema, Bijmolt, Petersen,
and Shulman (2018) and Petersen and Anderson (2015).
Because many retailers still treat product returns as a cost driver, they aim to limit product returns by setting a strict product
return policy which disincentivizes customers to return products. One way to reduce or prevent consumer returns is to impose
costs on consumers for returning (e.g., Davis, Hagerty, & Gerstner, 1998). More speciﬁcally, a retailer can create a hassle for
customers (i.e., effort leniency), impose a deadline on returns (i.e., time leniency), or charge a (restocking) fee (i.e., monetary
leniency). Janakiraman, Syrdal, and Freling (2016) review the effect of return policy leniency on a consumer’s return decision.
Recently, Altug and Aydinliyim (2016) study how the consumer’s strategic purchase behavior affects an online retailer’s return
policy. They show that retailers should not offer a refund option for a high-margin product with a low salvage value. Even for
retailers who should optimally permit returns, the optimal refund should not exceed the salvage value.
Although many retailers dislike product returns, stricter product return policies are not always more proﬁtable. A too strict
policy can negatively affect total demand by reducing a customer’s option value to purchase (Anderson, Hansen, & Simester,
2009), and has a negative effect on long-term customer value (Petersen & Kumar, 2009). Indeed, a satisfactory product return
experience may lead to future beneﬁts for the retailer. More speciﬁcally, allowing returns can lead to a positive effect on
the number of customer future purchases (Petersen & Kumar, 2009), referral behavior (Petersen & Kumar, 2010), customer
perceived purchase risk (Petersen & Kumar, 2015), and customer information value (Minnema, Bijmolt, Gensler, &Wiesel, 2016).
Moreover, Petersen and Kumar (2015) point out that product returns play a important role in the ﬁrm-customer exchange
process, noting that over 60% of surveyed retailers still do not consider product return behavior when allocating marketing
resources.
In summary, the existing operation literature mainly focuses on channel relationships under some contract or refund policy,
and does not incorporate consumer behavior as is done in the marketing literature.
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2.3. Contribution
This paper differs from the existing literature in three ways. First, our study is the ﬁrst to explore whether online retailers
should offer a full refund option for advanced sales in an uncertain environment. Second, although some studies (e.g., Su, 2009)
have modeled consumer returns caused by valuation uncertainty, we explicitly model the consumer returns of advanced sales
by incorporating both consumer strategic behavior and valuation uncertainty. As our analysis will show, this provides impor-
tant new insights on the proﬁtability of advanced selling in relation to the strategic market size. Third, whereas most existing
literature (e.g., Shulman et al., 2010) on consumer returns considers the situation that all returned products have to be salvaged,
we consider the case that returned products can be resold (after some reprocessing activities). This leads to important insights
on the proﬁtability of offering a refund option for advance sales dependent on the reselling cost.
3. Problem settings
Our general setting is that of a retailer who faces a single period newsvendor problem. The retailer can allow consumers to
place advance orders and also has the option to allow consumers to return items bought in advance. We explore the proﬁtability
of both options by comparing to the benchmark situation without advance selling. Table 1 lists the notation used in this paper.
3.1. Retailer settings
In the advance selling period, which ends before the start of the spot selling period, the retailer can allow consumers to
make purchases at a price pA per item and commits to fulﬁlling advance purchase orders in the spot selling period, guaranteeing
delivery to these consumers (i.e., guarding them against a potential stock out).
The retailer uses a price commitment strategy, i.e. announces the advance price and the spot selling price p simultaneously
at the beginning of the advance selling period. Since strategic customers in the spot selling market are less brand-loyal, the spot
sellingmarket is more competitive and the demand is more sensitive to the spot selling price. The spot selling price p is assumed
to be exogenous and its value is determined by using the reference pricing strategy, i.e., the selling price just equals (below) the
main price of its competitor. Note that we will discuss the impacts of spot selling proﬁt margin on the optimal policy and on the
proﬁt changes from advance selling vs. spot selling in a numerical study.
To reduce the valuation risk for consumers who buy in advance, not having seen the actual product, the retailer can offer
consumers the option to return items bought in advance for a full refund. Even if the full purchase price is refunded, a retailer or
a third-party logistics company may charge for return shipping and/or the consumer may face the time and effort related cost
of returning an item. For example, Amazon charges a convenience fee of $6 per order for picking up customer returns at their
preferred addresses by UPS, Tmall asks customers to return the products by any third-party logistics company and to pay all
shipping costs for the return.
We will refer to the sum of all return costs simply as the return cost, denoted by rb. We remark that the return cost is not a
decision variable of the retailer. If the item is returned then, after testing/repackaging, the returned product can be resold. We
denote the cost involved with a return by rc and refer to it as the reselling cost in order to avoid confusion with the consumer
return cost.
At the beginning of the spot selling period, the retailer delivers the preordered products and decides on the order quantity.
This quantity can be split as Q + dA, where dA products are used to fulﬁll orders from the advance selling period. Note that the
observed demand in the advance selling period can be used to update the demand forecast for the spot selling season. Further,
returned products can be resold and so the uncertain number of returns should be taken into account when deciding on Q.
Table 1
Model notation.
pA Advance selling price per unit;
p Spot selling price per unit;
Q Order quantity for the spot selling season
c Cost per unit, c < p;
rb Return cost per unit, the total cost of sending product back to the retailer;
rc Reselling cost per unit, rc < c;
s Salvage value per unit, s ≤ c − rc;
m Spot selling proﬁt margin per unit,m = p − c;
V Consumer valuation for a product which has mean lv , standard deviation sv , CDF F( • ) and PDF f( • ) with support on [s,U];
DA Demand (number of consumers who buy) in the advance selling period;
DS Demand (number of consumers who buy) in the spot selling season with mean lS and standard deviation sS;
UA Expected utilities for buying in the advance selling period
UW Expected utilities for waiting until the spot selling period
Ns Number of (informed) strategic consumers, a normally random variable, i.e., Ns ∼ N(ls ,s2s );
Nm Number of regular (myopic) consumers, a normally random variable, i.e., Nm ∼ N(lm ,s2m);
R Number of returned product;
4 Return risk, a normally random variable, i.e., 4 ∼ N(0,s24 );
k A critical fractile for spot selling demand, i.e., k = V−1((p − c)/(p − s)).
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3.2. Consumer settings
3.2.1. Consumer valuation
Consumer valuation is the maximum value a consumer is willing to pay. Consumers are uncertain about their own valuation
during the advance selling period. Therefore, we assume that consumer valuation V during this period is a random variable,
which has mean lv, standard deviation sv, a PDF f( • ) and a CDF F( • ) with a ﬁnite support on [s,U] where s is the salvage value
per unit. The realized valuation in the spot selling period is denoted by v. Note that the valuation uncertainty can be affected by
many factors and valuations can differ across consumers. To keep the problem tractable, however, we assume that all consumers
have the same valuation distribution.
3.2.2. Consumer surplus
Consumer surplus is the difference between the consumer valuation and the actual price he/she pays, i.e., V− p. If a consumer
buys in advance at an advance selling price pA and decides not to return, the uncertain surplus is V − pA. If the item is returned,
then there is a negative surplus −rb. Buying in the spot selling period implies a consumer surplus of v − p. Fig. 1 summarizes
the consumer surplus options with advance selling.
3.2.3. Consumer behavior, classiﬁcation and surplus
Although consumers have the same valuation distribution, we introduce consumer heterogeneity by grouping consumers
into two types: myopic and (informed) strategic. Informed strategic customers potentially consider buying in advance, but
myopic customers (including uninformed strategic customers) do not. Note that the deﬁnition of myopic consumer is consistent
with most of the literature (e.g., Shen & Su, 2007; Prasad, Venkatesh, & Mahajan, 2015), i.e., myopic customers make a buy-
now-or-leave-forever purchase decision when products are available. Let Nm and Ns denote the number of myopic and strategic
consumers, respectively. We assume that Nm and Ns follow a bivariate normal distribution with means lm and ls, standard
deviations sm and s s and correlation coeﬃcient q ∈ (−1, 1), i.e., (Nm,Ns) ∼ N(lm, ls,s2m,s2s ,q).
Amyopic or uninformed strategic customer buys if his surplus v− p is non-negative. The corresponding consumers’ expected
surplus is




Since consumer’s valuations are realized in the spot selling period, there are no valuation risk-related returns in the spot
selling period. We remark that in real life, some uncertainty may remain and so returns of items purchased in the spot selling
period could also be considered. However, as our focus is on the proﬁtability of advance sales and associated possible returns,
Fig. 1. Consumer surplus for different decisions.
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we focus purely on those returns. Moreover, our model can easily be extended to include spot selling returns by letting DS be
the net (i.e., not returned) spot period demand and modifying the spot selling margin.
Informed strategic customers ﬁrst need to decide between buying in advance or in the spot selling period (or not at all). If
they buy in advance, then they need to decide whether or not to return after the order is delivered and their consumer surplus
is realized.
We remark that the availability risk is not considered in our model, i.e., informed strategic consumers can get the product for
sure if they choose to buy in the spot selling period. Our reasons are as follows. First, both the consumer’s estimation of avail-
ability risk and the retailer’s order quantity are private information. There is no evidence to support that these are exchanged.
Second, for informed strategic consumers who choose to buy in the spot selling period, it is rational to buy the product at the
start of the spot selling period rather than wait until the end. Further, we discuss the impact of the availability risk on the main
results in Section 8.2.
Under the no-refund policy, the consumer’s expected surplus is
UNRA = E(V − pA) = lv − pA. (2)
Under a refund policy, a strategic customer returns the item and bears the return cost rb if his realized surplus v − pA is
lower than the negative surplus −rb. Otherwise, strategic consumers should keep the product and obtain a surplus of v − pA. In











Finally, we model uncertainty in the total number of returns. It is easy to see that a consumer (say i) chooses to return at
price pA if and only if his/her consumer utility is less than pA − rb, i.e., vi − pA ≤ −rb. So, aggregating over realized advance
demand dA, the expected total number of returns equals dAF(pA − rb). To include uncertainty in this number, which is realistic,
we model the total number of returns as
R|dA = dA(F(pA − rb) + 4) (4)
where 4 is independent with both Ns and Nm and follows a normal distribution, i.e., 4 ∼ N(0,s24 ). Note that without return risk
4, the number of returns is known exactly after advance demand is realized, and makes the problem become trivial. Retailer’s
decisions are summarized and depicted in Fig. 2.
4. A benchmark: the classic newsvendor
We ﬁrst determine the optimal order quantity and associated proﬁt without advance selling (and so without refund), which
serves as a benchmark for assessing the proﬁtability of introducing the advance ordering opportunity.
Under this scenario, demand in the advance selling period is obviously zero, i.e., DA = 0. During the spot selling period,
consumer valuations have realized and consumer i makes a purchase at price p if and only if his/her consumer surplus is
non-negative, i.e., vi − p ≥ 0. The fraction of all consumers who buy at price p is E(1(vi ≥ p)) = F¯(p). Therefore, the spot selling




E(1(vi ≥ p)) = (Ns + Nm)F¯(p),
Fig. 2. Timeline of decisions and events under the advance selling strategy with refund.
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where 1(k) is an indicator function, i.e., 1(k) = 1 if k is true, otherwise 1(k) = 0. Since the numbers of myopic and strategic
consumers are bivariate normally distributed, we have that the spot selling demand is normally distributed with a mean and a
variance as follows,
lS = E(DS) = (ls + lm)F¯(p),






The retailer’s expected proﬁt is
pSS(Q) = EDS{pmin{Q ,DS} + s(Q − DS)+ − cQ}.
Deciding on the optimal order quantity is a classic newsvendor problem with normally distributed demand. Following the
standard solution method (e.g., Silver, Pyke, & Peterson, 1998), the optimal order quantity and the optimal expected proﬁt are
QSS =(ls + lm)F¯(p) + k
√
s2s + s2m +2qsssmF¯(p),
pSS =(p − c)(ls + lm)F¯(p)− (p − s)0(k)F¯(p)
√
s2s + s2m +2qsssm, (5)
where k = V−1((p − c)/(p − s)), V( • ) and 0( • ) are the CDF and the PDF of the standard normal distribution respectively.
5. Advance selling without refund
Different from the classical newsvendor problem of the previous section, the advance selling price pNRA needs to be optimized
besides the spot period order quantity QNR. An important starting observation is that introducing the advanced selling oppor-
tunity only makes sense if the price discount is large enough to make strategic customers buy in advance, so that a two-period
selling problem indeed materializes.
We will ﬁrst optimize the optimal order quantity QNR for the spot selling period, given pNRA , and then optimize p
NR
A . As for the
case without advance sales (analyzed in Section 4), the retailer faces a newsvendor problem. However, the retailer can update
its forecast for demand in the spot selling season based on the advance demand realization dA (which does not depend on pNRA as
long as strategic consumers buy in advance). Using standard statistics, we get that the number of myopic consumers Nm follows
a normal distribution with updated mean and standard deviation as given by,





respectively. The demand during the spot selling season given dA, DS|dA , has an updated mean and standard deviation as follows,
lS|dA =
(




s2S |dA =s2m(1− q2)F¯2(p).
Note that the updated demand variance is decreasing in the correlation coeﬃcient q. The larger the correlation, the larger
the reduction of demand variance in the spot selling period, i.e., the larger the forecast accuracy improvement. So the optimal
order quantity QNR|dA is given by
QNR|dA = lS|dA + ksS|dA =
(







Note from Eq. (6) that QNR|dA is not affected by pNRA . Therefore, the optimal value for pNRA must be the smallest value that makes
strategic consumers buy in advance, i.e., for which UNRA ≥ UW . Obviously, the newsvendor will set UNRA = UW to maximize his
proﬁt. Combining Eqs. (1) and (2), we have




Based on Eqs. (6) and (7), the maximum expected proﬁt is
pNRAS =
(





ls + (p − c)lmF¯(p)− (p − s)0(k)sm
√
1 − q2F¯(p). (8)
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The difference between the optimal proﬁt of the advance selling newsvendor without refund and the classic newsvendor




=(p − c)lmF¯(p) + (p − c −
∫ p
s
F(x)dx)ls − (p − s)0(k)sm
√
1− q2F¯(p)
− (p − c)(ls + lm)F¯(p) + (p − s)0(k)F¯(p)
√
s2s + s2m +2qsssm




F¯(p)ls + (p − s)0(k)DsNR0 , (9)
where DsNR0 = F¯(p)
(√





Note that the three terms of the above proﬁt difference expressions have clear interpretations. The ﬁrst term represents the
added proﬁt from selling F(p)ls more items at price p
NR
A , by exploiting consumers’ valuation uncertainty. The second term is the
loss from selling at a discount to strategic customers who would otherwise have bought the item at the spot selling price. The
ﬁnal term is the safety stock reduction that results from better forecasting of spot selling demand after observing the advanced
sales.
The proﬁt difference expression and its interpretation also lead to the identiﬁcation of parameter settings where advance














F¯(p)ls on the proﬁt is negative, and the corresponding proﬁt deduction is increasing
with ls. The safety stock reduction (p− s)0(k)DsNR0 is not affected by ls and therefore only outweighs the proﬁt reduction from
offering a discount if ls is suﬃciently small. This is formalized in the following proposition:
Proposition 5.1. (AS without refund vs. no AS)
• If the spot selling proﬁt margin is higher than some threshold, i.e., m ≥ mNR = p−pNRAF(p) where m := p − c , then a retailer should
always sell in advance.
• Otherwise, the retailer should sell in advance only if the average number ls of informed strategic consumers is less than a
threshold, i.e., ls ≤ lNRs (m), where
lNRs (m) =
(p − s)0(V−1( mp−s ))DsNR0
p − pNRA − mF(p)
.
Note that lNRs (0) = 0 and lim
m→mNR
lNRs (m) = +∞.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Fig. 3 provides a graphical illustration of when advance selling is proﬁtable. Recall that we only consider cases where c > s,
to avoid situations with an inﬁnite optimal ordering quantity. Therefore, the maximum proﬁt margin considered is p − s.
Proposition 5.1 implies that whether or not advance selling is proﬁtable depends on both the spot selling proﬁt margin and
the market size of informed strategic consumers. If the advance selling discount is relatively small, then advance selling always
beneﬁts the retailer. Otherwise, advance selling is proﬁtable only if relatively few potential consumers consider buying in the
advance selling period.
Our results on whether or not to sell in advance mirror and build on those of Xie and Shugan (2001) and Prasad et al. (2011).
Under the assumption of constantmarket sizes, Xie and Shugan (2001) found that retailers should sell in advancewhenmarginal
costs are below some lower threshold of consumer valuation. If serving the low valuation segment is unproﬁtable due to a high
marginal cost, then spot selling to the high valuation segment is preferred. If market sizes are uncertain, then Prasad et al. (2011)
found that no retailer should sell in advance if the difference between consumer expected valuation and consumer expected
surplus of waiting is higher than a threshold. Our results further show that, besides the marginal valuation/cost, the market size
of potential (informed strategic) consumers in the advance selling period affects the optimal strategy on advance selling.
6. Advance selling with refund
We now consider advance selling with a refund option. Analogously to Section 5, we start by deriving the optimal ordering
quantity QR given pRA. Again, the retailer faces a newsvendor problem with demand forecast updates based on the advance
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Fig. 3. Optimal advanced selling strategy — no AS vs. AS without refund.
demand realization dA, where the retailer can resell returned products from the advanced sales period. Recall from Section 3
that the number of returns is given by
R|dA = dA(F(pRA − rb) + 4)
where 4 is independent with both Ns and Nm and follows a normal distribution, i.e., 4 ∼ N(0,s24 ). Therefore, the return of
advanced sales R|dA follows a normal distribution with mean dAF(pRA − rb) and variance d2As24 .
The net demand during the spot selling season given dA, DSN|dA is deﬁned as
DSN|dA = (DS − R)|dA = DS|dA − R|dA .
Since the covariance between DS|dA and R|dA is
Cov(DS|dA ,R|dA ) = Cov(Nm|dA F¯(p),dA(F(pRA − rb) + 4)) = dAF¯(p)Cov(Nm|dA , 4) = 0,
we have that DS|dA are R|dA independent. Therefore, the net demand during the spot selling season given dA, DSN|dA , has a mean
and a standard deviation as follows,
lSN|dA =lS|dA − dAF(pRA − rb) =
(
lm + q(dA − ls)sm
ss
)
F¯(p)− dAF(pRA − rb),
s2SN|dA =s2S |dA + d2As24 = s2m(1− q2)F¯2(p) + d2As24 .
So the optimal order quantity QR is given by
QR|dA =lSN|dA + ksSN|dA
=
(
lm + q(dA − ls)sm
ss
)
F¯(p)− dAF(pRA − rb) + k
√
s2m(1− q2)F¯2(p) + d2As24 . (10)
Further, the maximum expected proﬁt is as follows:
pRAS =(p − c)lmF¯(p) + (pRA − c)lsF¯(pRA − rb)
− rclsF(pRA − rb) − (p − s)0(k)EDA (sSN|dA ) (11)




s2m(1− q2)F¯2(p) + D2As24 .
Note from the third term of Eq. (11) that a higher advance selling price is not always better, as it will increase returns and
associated costs. So, different from the case without refund, it may be optimal to set pRA below the maximum advance selling
price at which strategic consumers buy in advance. Ignoring this bound on the advance selling price for now, Eq. (11) leads to
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)′ ≥ 0 for all x in
its domain. Most widely used valuation distributions (e.g., the uniform, normal, and negative exponential) in the operations
management literature are of this type (see Lariviere, 2006), and so we will restrict our attention to them. Let p0A denote the














Note that it can be easily proved that p0A is increasing in c.
Of course, we also need to ensure that pRA is small enough to make strategic consumers buy in advance, as mentioned before
similar to the analysis in Section 5, URA ≥ 0 and URA ≥ UW must hold. Using Eqs. (1) and (3), we then get pRA ≤ p¯A where p¯A
satisﬁes




So, the optimal advance selling price is
pRA =
{
p0A, if c ∈ [s, c0],
p¯A, if c ∈ [c0,p],
where c0 satisﬁes p0A(c
0) = p¯A. We further obtain the following analytical sensitivity results:
Proposition 6.1.
(1) The optimal advance selling price decreases as the spot selling proﬁt margin increases, i.e., dpRA/dm ≤ 0.
(2) The optimal advance selling price decreases as the reselling cost increases, i.e., dpRA/drc ≤ 0.
(3) The optimal advance selling price ﬁrst rises and then drops as the return cost increases, i.e., dpRA/drb ≥ 0 if rb ≤ r0b and









Proof. See Appendix. 
The ﬁrst result in Proposition 6.1 is in line with previous arguments. If the spot selling margin is higher, then advance selling
remains proﬁtable for a larger price discount range. Result (2) is also intuitive. The effect of the return cost on the optimal
advance selling price is two-fold. For small enough return costs, the advance sales discount is larger than what is needed to
make strategic consumers buy in advance. In this return cost range, a higher return cost reduces the return probability, even if
the advance selling price is somewhat higher. This explains why the advance selling price is increasing in the return cost if that
cost remains relatively small. For a relatively high return cost, however, the discount is set just high enough to make strategic
consumers buy in advance. A (further) increase in the return cost reduces the utility of buying early below than the utility of
waiting. To ensure that consumers still buy in advance, the retailer should then lower the advance selling price.




The proof is straightforward and omitted. The result in Proposition 6.2 is intuitive. If returns become more uncertain, then
more products are returned which results in a proﬁt loss. Therefore, uncertainty in consumer return always hurts retailers.








− (p − s)0(k)EDA (s ′SN)
− (p − c)(lm + ls)F¯(p) + (p − s)0(k)F¯(p)
√
s2s + s2m +2qsssm













+ (p − s)0(k)DsRN0 (ls) (14)
where DsRN0 (ls) = F¯(p)
√
s2s + s2m +2qsssm − EDA (sSN|dA ).
All terms of the proﬁt difference expression again have clear interpretations. The ﬁrst term represents the added proﬁt from
selling F(p)ls more items at price p
R
A. The second term is the loss from selling at a discount to strategic customers who would
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otherwise have bought the item at the spot selling price. The third term is the reselling loss from consumers returns. The ﬁnal
term corresponds to the safety stock reduction/increment that results from the trade-off between better forecasting of spot
selling demand and increased uncertainty from returns.
This proﬁt difference expression and interpretation also lead to the identiﬁcation of parameter settingswhere advance selling
with refund is proﬁtable. If the proﬁt margin p − c is relative large, then the proﬁt from additional sales (pRA − c) F(p)ls is larger




F¯(p)ls and the return loss
(






ls for all values of ls. The safety stock reduction
(p−s)0(k)DsNR0 (ls) is decreasing in ls and therefore the retailer should sell in advance and offering a refund option if ls is relative

















the proﬁt is negative, and the corresponding proﬁt deduction is increasing with ls. Therefore, the retailer should sell in advance
only if ls is suﬃciently small. This is formalized in the following theorem:
Theorem 1. (AS with refund vs. no AS) If the average number of informed strategic consumers is less than a threshold, i.e., ls ≤ lRs (m),

















F¯(p)− (pRA − c) F(p) + (pRA − c+ rc) F (pRA − rb) .
Proof. See Appendix. 
Fig. 4 provides a graphical illustration of Theorem 1. Note that there are two cases. Fig. 4 (a) is similar to Fig. 3, and arguably
most intuitive. Advance selling always increases total net demand, even if some products are returned, which becomes more
attractive for larger proﬁt margins. However, if the return fraction is large and managing returns is costly, then the negative
effect of increased returns handling cost can almost cancel out the increase in sales revenue. Under such conditions, the safety
stock effect becomes dominant for strategy selection. For very small proﬁt margins, the safety stock is very small and so there
is not much safety stock cost reduction potential from demand forecast improvements through advance selling. For very large
proﬁt margins and so, relatively, a very small cost c, there is again a low beneﬁt of improved forecasting as stocks are not
expensive. For cases in between, where the proﬁt margin is neither very high nor very low, the cost savings potential from
improved forecasting are highest. This then leads to the policy trade-off as illustrated in Fig. 4 (b).
Combining Proposition 5.1 and Theorem 1, we ﬁnd the advantages of advance selling with or without refund stem from
improved demand forecast accuracy aswell as increased total sales. However, advance selling does imply a smaller proﬁtmargin
and increased costs for handling consumer returns.
Having analyzed no advance selling vs. ﬁrst advance selling without and then with refund, we next compare the proﬁts of
advance selling with or without refund. Combined with Proposition 5.1, this will then allow us to paint a complete picture of
when no advance sales, advance sales without refund or advance sales with refund is optimal.
Fig. 4. Optimal advanced selling strategy — no AS vs. AS with refund.
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From Eqs. (8) and (11), we get
DpR =pRAS − pNRAS












− (p − s)0(k)EDA (s ′SN)
− (p − c)lmF¯(p)−
(




















ls − (p − s)0(k)DsR0 (ls),
where DsR0 (ls) = EDA (sSN|dA ) − sm
√
1− q2F¯(p) ≥ 0.
The ﬁrst term of the above proﬁt difference expression represents the added proﬁt from selling ls items at a higher advance
selling price pRA, by offering consumers a refund option. The second term is the loss from consumers returns and the remanufac-
turing of returned products. The ﬁnal term is the loss from safety stock increases that results from uncertain returns. We obtain
the following structural result:
Theorem 2. (AS with refund vs. AS without refund) A retailer who sells a product in advance should offer a refund option if the
average number of informed strategic consumers ls is below l
0
s (m), where l
0
s (m) is decreasing in spot selling proﬁt margin m and





















Proof. See Appendix. 
Fig. 5 provides a graphical illustration of Theorem 2. As the only advantage, offering a refund option reduces the advance
selling discount, thereby increasing the added proﬁt per product sold in advance that is not returned. This is particularly an
important beneﬁt if the spot selling proﬁt margin is small to start with. However, allowing returns does lead to an increase in
net demand uncertainty and thereby in the safety stock, more so if many consumers buy in advance. Combined, these effects
explain why (in Fig. 5) offering a refund option is proﬁtable for small enough proﬁt margins and small enough strategic market
sizes.
By combining Proposition 5.1 and Theorems 1–2, we can identify settings where either of the three considered strate-
gies is preferable. This is depicted in Fig. 6. Please note that this ﬁgure is again only an illustration, but the next section will
present numerical examples that conﬁrm its shape. We also remark that the lNRs (m), l
R
s (m) and l
0
s (m) lines may not intersect at
(approximately) the same point, but our numerical results will show that they typically do.
Fig. 6 has clear and relevant interpretations. If the proﬁt margin is (very) large, then advance selling is best as it leads to
considerable extra revenue and avoids costly returns. For small proﬁt margins and large strategic market sizes, advance selling
is not proﬁtable at all since the discount loss offered to many customers outweighs the beneﬁts from increased total sales and
more accurate forecasting. For small proﬁt margins and small strategic market sizes, advance selling with refund is optimal. By
Fig. 5. Optimal advanced selling strategy — AS without refund vs. AS with refund.
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Fig. 6. Optimal advanced selling strategy — no AS vs. AS without refund vs. AS with refund.
offering the refund option, ﬁrms can sell in advance at a lower discount, making advance selling proﬁtable even at lower proﬁt
margins, as long as the strategic market size is not too large.
The combination of a lowmargin (say below 30%) and a relatively low strategic market size (of brand enthusiasts) is realistic,
and so there may indeed bemany real-life cases where advance selling with refund is the most proﬁtable strategy. The potential
proﬁt increase from allowing returns will be explored numerically in the next section.
7. Numerical study
So far, we have obtained analytical insights into the regions (combinations of strategic market size and proﬁt margin) where
a certain type of strategy is optimal. Recalling that our key contribution is to include the advance selling with refund strategy,
this section provides further numerical insights into (a) the size of the region where this is the best strategy, and (b) the proﬁt
increase from allowing a refund.
We do so in relation to the return costs for consumers, the returns handling cost for the retailer, and the valuation uncer-
tainty. These three model elements are closely linked to allowing a refund. The ﬁrst two obviously affect return-related costs.
The third is related to the beneﬁt from returns, since more valuation uncertainty implies a higher advance selling discount that
can be reduced by allowing a refund. Parameters rc, rb and sv will therefore be varied for the examples considered. The other
parameters are ﬁxed as follows: p = 5, s = 1, lv = 5, q = 0.5, s4 = 0.1, ls = 150, sm = 40 and s s = 10. Other exam-
ples produced similar results. Note also that s s is set considerably lower than sm as the strategic market (of brand enthusiasts)
typically has a smaller size than the myopic market (and may also be relatively less uncertain due to frequent interaction with
those consumers).
7.1. The impact of return-related market parameters on strategy selection
We start by varying the standard deviations of consumer valuation sv ∈ {1, 2.5, 4}, ﬁxing rc at 0.4 and rb at 0.1. Fig. 7 presents
the critical thresholds of the strategic market size, i.e., lNRs (m), l
R
s (m) and l
0
s (m). Note from this ﬁgure that more valuation
uncertainty increases the area where offering a refund option for advance sales is beneﬁcial. A more uncertain valuation implies
a larger advance selling discount deduction without a refund option, and correspondingly a larger beneﬁt from reducing that
discount by offering a refund option.
We next vary the unit reselling cost rc ∈ {0.4, 1, 1.6}, ﬁxing sv at 2.5 and rb at 0.1; and vary the unit return cost rb ∈
{0.1, 1.3, 2.5}, ﬁxing sv at 2.5 and rc at 0.4. Figs. 8 and 9 present the critical thresholds of the strategic market size (i.e., lNRs (m),
lRs (m) and l
0
s (m)) with varying unit reselling cost and varying unit return cost, respectively. Note that varying the unit return
cost has a very similar effect on the optimal strategy as varying the unit reselling cost. More speciﬁcally, a higher reselling
(return) cost reduces the size of the area where offering a refund option for advance sales is beneﬁcial. Since fewer customers
(retailers) choose to return (offer a refund option) if the return (reselling) cost is relatively high, this result is intuitive.
7.2. The impact of return-related market parameters on the proﬁtability of allowing a refund
Rather than showing the proﬁt increase from advance sales with or without refund for all combinations of strategic market
size and spot selling proﬁt margin (which would require a 3D picture), we consider a relatively small (ls = 10) and large
strategic market size (ls = 70). Let sv = 2.5, rc = 0.4, rb = 0.1. In Fig. 10 we consider these situations side by side, and
show the proﬁt increase from advance selling with (dashed line) and without refund (solid line) vs. no advance selling.
As Fig. 10 (a) shows, advance selling with refund is the most proﬁtable strategy for ‘medium’ proﬁt margins between 5%
and 30%. For even bigger spot selling period proﬁt margins, reducing the discount through allowing a refund plays less of a role
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Fig. 7. Optimal policy with varying standard deviations of consumer’s valuation.
and advance selling without refund is more proﬁtable. For very low-proﬁt margins, the required discount is too high even with
refunds allowed, and spot selling only is best. An interesting result is that for most of the 5%–30% proﬁt margin range where
advance selling with refund is the best strategy, it outperforms the other strategies by more than 5% and sometimes even more
than 10%. However, for a relative big strategic market considered in Fig. 10 (b), offering a refund option is never proﬁtable. In
this situation, the loss from returns is too large compared to the other strategies.
We next discuss the proﬁt increase from advance sales with or without refund for combinations of spot proﬁt margin and
unit return cost. We consider a relative small (m/p = 10%, i.e., c = 4.5) and big proﬁt margin ratio (m/p = 40%, i.e., c = 3).
Let sv = 2.5, rc = 0.4, ls = 10. In Fig. 11 we consider these situations side by side, and show the proﬁt increase from advance
selling with (dashed line) and without refund (solid line) vs. no advance selling.
As Fig. 11 (a) shows, for a relative big proﬁt margin product, offering a refund for advanced sales is never optimal although
it is always proﬁtable. Since increasing the return cost reduce the return probability which may result in a decrease in advance
selling discount, the loss from offering a refund can be reduced by increasing the return cost. However, for a relatively small
proﬁt margin product considered in Fig. 11 (b), advance selling with refund is the most proﬁtable strategy for the ‘low’ return
cost between 0% and 25%. For an even higher return cost, further increasing the return cost reduces the utility of buying early
below than the utility of waiting. To ensure that consumers still buy in advance, the retailer should offer a bigger advance selling
discount. Since the required discount is too high even without a refund, spot selling only is best. An encouraging result is that
for a large and arguably the most realistic return cost range (0%–25%), advance selling with refund is the best strategy.
7.3. Extension: endogenousness of spot selling price
In this section, we study how an endogenous spot selling price affects the retailer’s advance selling strategy. This is done by
numerically solving the ﬁrst-order conditions of pSS, pNRAS and p
NR
AS given in Eqs. (5), (8) and (11), respectively. We remark that,
Fig. 8. Optimal policy with varying unit reselling costs.
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Fig. 9. Optimal policy with varying unit return costs.
under the advance selling with refund strategy, the optimal advance selling price are in two different cases, thereby the optimal
spot selling price is the price that gives the highest proﬁt in both cases.
Our discussions are centered around two different (small vs. large) strategic market sizes (ls = 10 and ls = 70). Let
sv = 2.5, rc = 0.1 and rb = 0.1. In Tables 2 and 3, we consider the small and large market size settings side by side, and show
the optimal spot selling prices and their corresponding optimal proﬁts under the three different strategies (no advance selling,
advance selling without refund, and advance selling with refund).
From Tables 2 and 3, it is clear that no advance selling (advance selling without refund) strategy is optimal only if the retailer
has a relatively high (low) cost. Offering a refund for advanced sales is the best strategy only if the informed strategic consumers
has a relatively small population and the retailer has a medium purchasing cost. Otherwise, offering a refund is never optimal.
Recall that the same effects were observed analytically for a ﬁxed price comparison in Fig. 6.
However, some changes can be noticed that relate to the exogenousness of spot selling price. Since themean and the standard
deviation of consumer valuation are assumed to be 5 and 2.5, i.e., lv = 5 and sv = 2.5, from Table 2, the probability that no
advance selling strategy is optimal is very small (less than 6%). Since the (expected) consumer valuation is normally higher than
the cost, advance selling with or without refund is always optimal if the strategic market size is relatively big.
Moreover, from Tables 2 and 3, it is clear that the optimal spot prices (spot proﬁt margins, i.e., p − c) are increasing
(decreasing) with respect to the cost. The exact range of margins achieved depends on the selected strategy. Under the no
advance selling strategy, the spot proﬁt margins range [2.796, 4.933] for ls = 10, and [2.606, 4.923] for ls = 100. If retail-
ers employ advance selling with refund strategy, the spot proﬁt margin range is narrowed to [3.121, 4.737] for ls = 10 and
[3.273, 4.74] for ls = 100. However, not offering a refund for advanced sales leads to larger ranges [2.866, 5.15] for ls = 10
and [4.245, 6.657] for ls = 100. This is explained as follows. To offer discounts for advanced sales, the retailer has to ensure
that advance selling strategy has a higher spot proﬁt margin than no advance selling strategy. As a result, the lower bounds of
Fig. 10. Proﬁt gap changes in proﬁt margin and strategic market size.
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Fig. 11. Proﬁt gap changes in return cost and proﬁt margin.
the spot proﬁt margin are increased by advance selling. Further, when offering refunds for advanced sales, the retailer needs to
ensure that the spot proﬁt margin is small enough to make strategic consumers buy in advance and not return. Therefore, the
upper bounds of the spot proﬁt margin under the advance selling with refund strategy are decreased. However, without offer-
ing a refund, the retailer only needs to ensure that the advance selling discount is large enough. This results in an increase in the
spot proﬁt margin. Therefore, the upper bound of the spot proﬁt margin is increased under the advance selling without refund
strategy.
8. Conclusion
Our study is the ﬁrst to explore whether online retailers should offer a full refund option for advanced sales. Our contribution
to the literature is two-fold. First, our results reveal when allowing a refund is proﬁtable for retailers. Most advance selling
literature (e.g., Xie & Shugan, 2001; Prasad et al., 2011) considers advance selling for its ability to exploit valuation uncertainty
of consumers. From this perspective, allowing returns is not intuitive, as dissatisﬁed consumers can return these products.
However, we show that allowing returns leads to a higher advance sales price and can thereby increase the proﬁt margin from
unreturned products. This is particularly important if the regular spot selling proﬁt margin is not large to start with. We further
show that, besides the proﬁt margin, the market size of potential (informed strategic) consumers in the advance selling period
also plays a crucial role in determining whether or not allowing a refund is optimal.
Second, our results contribute to the product returns literature from both operations and marketing perspectives. Most
operations literature (Mostard & Teunter, 2006; Shulman et al., 2010; Ferguson et al., 2006; Su, 2009) considers the situation
that the product return rate is exogenously given and/or all returned products are not resalable (but be salvaged or returned
to the manufacturer). Our study characterizes the consumer’s product return behavior and considers the case that returned
products can be resold (after reprocessing). This leads to important insights on the proﬁtability of offering a refund option for
advance sales in relation to the reselling cost. As the reselling cost increases, allowing returns is less likely to be proﬁtable.
The marketing literature (Petersen & Kumar, 2009, 2010, 2015; Minnema et al., 2016) shows that allowing returns and using a
Table 2
Optimal price and maximal proﬁt with a small strategic market size of ls = 10.
No AS AS without refund AS with refund
cost Optimal price Maximal proﬁt Optimal price Maximal proﬁt Optimal price Maximal proﬁt
c pSS pSS p
NR pNRAS p
R pRAS
11 13.796 10.777 13.866 −43.438 14.121 9.086
10 12.975 16.728 13.050 −27.727 13.268 16.218
9 12.171 25.295 12.251 −9.576 12.421 26.112
8 11.384 37.308 11.470 11.754 11.570 39.592
7 10.615 53.750 10.708 37.121 10.718 57.590
6 9.864 75.767 9.966 67.501 9.868 81.124
5 9.131 104.694 9.242 104.002 9.027 111.299
4 8.412 142.134 8.535 147.912 8.213 149.377
3 7.704 190.160 7.841 200.846 7.435 197.027
2 6.993 251.991 7.150 265.226 6.737 257.020
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Table 3
Optimal price and maximal proﬁt with a big strategic market size of ls = 100.
No AS AS without refund AS with refund
Cost Optimal price Maximal proﬁt Optimal price Maximal proﬁt Optimal price Maximal proﬁt
c pSS pSS p
NR pNRAS p
R pRAS
11 13.606 20.730 15.245 −534.194 14.273 −24.271
10 12.787 31.646 14.454 −430.921 13.118 −7.148
9 11.985 47.041 13.679 −326.129 12.100 13.777
8 11.203 68.173 12.919 −219.294 11.175 40.171
7 10.440 96.461 12.175 −109.776 10.313 73.636
6 9.699 133.461 11.447 3.188 9.492 115.709
5 8.980 180.874 10.735 120.503 8.702 167.900
4 8.280 240.596 10.036 243.257 7.940 231.813
3 7.597 314.909 9.347 372.830 7.372 309.669
2 6.923 407.139 8.657 511.243 6.740 404.557
lenient return policy can have long-run beneﬁts for retailers. Our study indicates that allowing returns is proﬁtable even in a
short term as it allows a reduction of the advance sales discount and an increase of the spot selling price, thereby increases the
proﬁt margin from both unreturned products and regular sales.
8.1. Managerial implications
Allowing returns for advanced sales can be effective for increasing the retailer’s short-run proﬁt. It allows a reduction of the
advanced sales discount and an increase of the spot selling price. This improves the proﬁtability of advanced sales especially
when proﬁt margins are slim (less than 30%). However, if the fraction of strategic (informed) customers is too large, then it is
still better to not sell in advance at all, since otherwise toomany products would be sold at a discount. Therefore, advance selling
with a refund option works best for products with a small proﬁt margin and a relatively small fraction of strategic consumers.
In practice, it may be diﬃcult to estimate howmany potential consumers are informed. In such a situation, pre-selling a limited
quantity is a good alternative which has been widely used by JD in China.
For a relatively high-margin product category, not offering a refund option for advanced sales maximizes short-term proﬁt
as there is relatively less to gain and more to lose through costly returns. Even if the cost for handling returns is low, offering a
refund is no longer optimal for a suﬃciently high proﬁt margin. However, we remark that it is unclear whether no-refund policy
is then also the best from a long-run perspective, since unsatisﬁed purchase experiences with return optionsmay prevent future
purchases.
Current strategies at Amazon and JD are the most compelling examples to support these implications. Amazon only presells
digital products (video, digital games, softwares and kindle books), which have relatively high proﬁt margins and low returns
handling costs. Consistent with our ﬁndings, Amazon never allow returns after the release date. Different from Amazon, JD
presells in almost all product categories (e.g., consumer electronics, computer, food, and clothing), including many low margin
products. JD does allow returns of products purchased in advance, and in fact uses the same product return policy (7-day uncon-
ditional return) as for regular selling products. Moreover, JD limits the amount of products sold in advance. This is consistent
with our results that allowing refunds for advance sales is indeed proﬁtable for (mainly) low margin products, but only if not
too many products are sold in advance at a discount.
8.2. Research limitations and future research
Some limitations of our work and corresponding future research opportunities should be noted. We omitted the availability
risk. Availability risk could result in a decrease of consumer’s expected utility for waiting. As a result, the advance selling price
(e.g., pNRA and p
R
A = p¯A) could be lowered further. This implies that the spot selling only strategy becomes more proﬁtable
compared to the other strategies, i.e., the area where no advance selling is optimal could grow in Fig. 6. However, when offering
a refund for a relatively high-proﬁt margin product, the advance selling price is unaffected by the availability risk, i.e., pRA = p
0
A,
where p0A is determined by the marginal proﬁt of advanced sales. Since the advance selling price under the no-refund strategy is
lowered by the availability risk, offering a refund option for advance sales is more beneﬁcial, i.e., the area where advance selling
without refund is optimal could shrink in Fig. 6. For high-proﬁt margin products, allowing refund for advanced sales may still
be optimal if the availability risk is relatively high.
In line with previous research, our model assumes that all consumers are independent and have the same product valuation.
In practice, consumers valuations are different (i.e., a part is insensitive to price) and may be dependent (i.e., through group
buying). It is worthwhile to extend our model with heterogeneous and/or dependent consumers. Another future research
avenue is to extend our analysis into a competitive environment. Although most companies choose to avoid head-to-head
competition during the advance selling period in practice, it is interesting to study how competition in the spot selling period
(or in both periods) affects the advance selling strategy as well as the refund strategy. Besides, it is interesting to consider
a newsvendor with limited liquidity (capital constraint). Advance selling not only is a marketing strategy, but can also be a
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ﬁnancial strategy. A retailer can gain ﬁnancial capital and improve his cash ﬂow by selling in advance. As a result, a retailer
can procure a suﬃcient amount of stock to buffer against variations for spot selling demand. However, selling in advance may
increase the bankruptcy risk because of the advance selling discount and increased net demand uncertainty. Therefore, it is
interesting to study this operations-ﬁnance interface problem, and investigate the impact of limited liquidity on the advance
selling strategy.
Finally, to strengthen of the credibility of our results, it is valuable to test them empirically. Case studies at ﬁrms such as
Amazon or JD can explore through interviews with marketing and operations managers how retailers decide whether or not to
offer a refund for advanced sales. Lab experiments can verify whether decision makers act in line with the theoretical results
and in particular whether they are more likely to opt for a refund on advanced sales for lower proﬁt margins and a smaller
strategic market size. Hypothesis based on our ﬁndings, such as “the size of the strategic market is negatively associated with
the number of product returns”, can be tested in a survey approach.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 5.1. Let c(m) = mF(p)− ∫ ps F(x)dx. It is clear that c(m) is increasing inm, c(0) ≤ 0 and c(p) ≥ 0. Therefore,









such that c(mNR) = 0. Ifm ≥ mNR, thenDpNRAS ≥ 0 always holds. Otherwise, DpNRAS is decreasing in ls and there exists a critical lNRs
such that DpNRAS (l
NR
s ) = 0. Note that the critical market size l
NR
s is increasing inm and l
NR
s (0) = 0. If ls ≤ lNRs (m), then DpNRAS ≥ 0;
otherwise, DpNRAS ≤ 0. 
Proof of Proposition 6.1. (1) Recall that p0A satisﬁes
dpRAS
dpRA
= 0. Using Eq. (11) and differentiating
dpRAS
dpRA






) ≥ 0 which implies p0A is increasing in c. Since p¯A is independent from c and the proﬁt marginm is decreasing
in c, we have that pRA is increasing in c and decreasing inm.
(2) The proof is very similar to that of part (1) and omitted here.










. If rb ≥ r0b or pRA = p¯A, then differentiating both sides of Eq. (13) with





≤ 0, which implies that the optimal advance selling price is decreasing in rb.
If rb ≤ r0b or pRA = p0A, then using Eq. (11) and differentiating
dpRAS
dpRA


















Since the valuation function has an IFR, by the deﬁnition of IFR, we have that f ′(x)F¯(x) + f 2(x) ≥ 0 or f ′(x) ≥ − f2(x)
F¯(x)
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) • (F¯ (p0A − rb)− (p0A − c+ rc) f (p0A − rb))= 0,
which implies that the optimal advance selling price is increasing in rb. 








= C(c) − (p − s)0(k)dEDA (sSN|dA )
dls
.




(p − s)0(k)DsRN0 (ls) ≥ 0. Therefore, if
dDpRAS
dls
≥ 0, then DpRAS ≥ 0 which implies the retailer always
beneﬁt from offering a refund option. If
dDpRAS
dls




= 0. If ls ≤ lRs , then DpRAS ≥ 0
which indicates that the retailer should choose a refund policy; otherwise, the retailer should choose spot selling only. Therefore,





























A ≤ p¯A, then F¯
(
pRA − rb
)− (pRA − c+ rc) f (pRA − rb)= 0, which implies that C′(c) = F (pRA − rb)−F(p) ≤ 0.
If pRA = p¯A, i.e., p
0
A ≥ p¯A, then we have F¯
(
pRA − rb





− F(p) ≤ 0.
Further, we have that if C(s) ≤ 0, then dDpRASdls ≤ 0 holds for all c; otherwise, then there exist a critical cost c0 such that C(c0) = 0.




Next, we verify the sign of
dDpRAS
dls






















Since the PDF of the standard normal distribution is a concave function, i.e., 0′′(k) ≤ 0, and pRA is increasing in c, we have that
d3DpRAS
dlsdc2
≥ 0 indicating that dDpRASdls is convex in c. Note that
dDpRAS
dls








|c=cR = 0. If c ∈ [s, cR], then
dDpRAS
dls
≥ 0. If c ∈ [cR, c0], then dDpRASdls ≤ 0.




≤ 0. Then, if ls ≤ lRs , DpRAS ≥ 0; otherwise DpRAS ≤ 0. When C(s) ≤ 0, DpRAS ≥ 0 if ls ≤ lRs , otherwise DpRAS ≤ 0.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let C˜(c) := C(c)− (p − c)F(p) + (p − pNRA )= (pRA − pNRA )− (pRA − c+ rc) F (pRA − rb). Differentiating DpR with
respect to ls gives
dDpR
dls





DpR = 0. Thus, we have that if dDp
R
dls












































= C˜(p) ≥ C˜(s).
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It follows from Proposition 5.1 and Theorem 1 that offering a refund option at a very high proﬁt margin is not always optimal.
Thus, we only consider the case that C˜(s) < 0. If C˜(p) ≤ 0 then dDpRdls ≤ 0 always holds, which implies DpR ≤ 0. If C˜(s) ≤ 0 and
C˜(p) ≥ 0 then there exist a unique c0 orm0 = p − c0 such that dDpRdls |c=c0 = 0 and d
2DpR
dlsdc
|c=c0 ≥ 0, where c0 is a function of ls. So
c0 satisﬁes
C˜(c0) = (p − s)0(k(c0))dEDA (sSN|dA )
dls
. (15)
If c ≤ c0 orm ≥ m0 then dDpRdls ≤ 0, which implies DpR ≤ 0. Otherwise dDp
R
dls

























s2m(1− q2)F¯2(p) + x2s24 dx ≤ 0.
































0(ls)) is increasing (decreasing) in ls.
From Eq. (15), c0(ls) also can be rewritten as a function ls with respect to c orm, i.e., l
0
s (c) or l
0
s (m) where l
0



















If ls ≤ l0s (m), then the retailer should choose offer a refund option. Otherwise, the retailer should not do so.
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